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NOTE
United States v. Maynard and
Enforcement of United States Drug
Trafficking Laws on the High Seas: How
Far Does United States Jurisdiction
Really Reach?
INTRODUCTION
The flow of illegal drugs from foreign countries into the
United States has increased substantially. Seventy-five percent
of the marijuana supply available in the United States is from
foreign sources, primarily from Colombia and Mexico, and al-
most one-hundred percent of the cocaine supply is from foreign
sources.' The United States through its drug trafficking laws has
sought to combat the shipment of illegal drugs on the high seas.'
The high seas is one avenue for illicit drug trafficking.3 In
1986, in furtherance of United States policy to curb drug traf-
ficking,4 Congress revised and recodified 21 U.S.C. section 955a,
I NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE REPORT 1988, 5, 19-28
(1989) [hereinafter NNICC Report].
' See infra notes 35-72 and accompanying text.
3 The high seas include all waters beyond the territorial seas of the United States
and beyond the territorial seas of any foreign nation. See infra note 21.
Marijuana is still transported via the high seas, even though there is evidence of
changing marijuana trafficking patterns indicating that land transport through Latin
American countries has become the more predominant route. This has been inferred by
the decline in maritime marijuana seizures off the coast of the southeastern United
States, the Bahamas and the Caribbean from 1986 to 1988. NNICC Report, supra note 1,
at 14. The decline in seizures in these areas is not a direct indication of decrease in the
use of the high seas as a trafficking route. Although there is evidence that drug traffick-
ers now prefer to use smaller fishing and private vessels to hinder previously effective
interdiction by avoiding detection that skews the statistics, the NNICC still contends
that Colombian marijuana most commonly is transported by noncommercial vessels
along the traditional trafficking routes. Id. at 14, 21, 46. Colombian cocaine trafficking to
the United States is primarily on the high seas. Id. at 46.
' In 1980 the Reagan Administration declared a "war on drugs." From 1982 to 1988,
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the Marijuana on the High Seas Act.' By this Act, Congress
hoped to create a more substantial basis of subject matter juris-
diction over acts of drug trafficking committed aboard United
States,6 stateless7 and foreign vessels8 on the high seas pursuant
to 46 U.S.C. sections 1901 et seq., the Maritime Drug Law En-
forcement Act."
Congress created this broader jurisdictional basis"' in order
to apply United States criminal laws to persons trafficking drugs
in international waters." Yet, the United States was unable to
establish a proper jurisdictional basis to subject three defend-
ants in United States v. Maynard12 to United States law. These
defendants were British nationals sailing on a British registered
vessel that was boarded by the United States Coast Guard on
the high seas, approximately twenty miles south of Puerto Rico.
The Coast Guard searched the vessel and found 660 kilograms of
marijuana on board.13 The Coast Guard then seized the vessel
after obtaining clearance from the United States Coast Guard
Commandant in Washington, D.C. This clearance was based
upon the Coast Guard's assessment that the vessel was stateless,
and therefore the United States had jurisdiction over it. The de-
fendants were convicted of marijuana possession with intent to
the annual federal budget to enforce marijuana laws rose from $526 million to $968 mil-
lion. N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1989, at A17, col. 2.
5 21 U.S.C. § 955a (1982). See infra notes 39-43.
6 46 U.S.C. § 1903(b) (Supp. V 1987). According to section 1903(b) United States
vessels include: a vessel documented under chapter 121 of Title 46; or a vessel numbered
as provided in chapter 123 of Title 46 and a vessel owned in whole or part by the U.S., a
citizen or national of the U.S., or a corporation created under the laws of the U.S. or any
State. Id.
See infra notes 43, 68-72 and accompanying text.
8 A foreign vessel is a vessel owned by residents of a foreign nation or one sailing
under a foreign flag. Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas states that each nation
"shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships." Article 5 also requires
the existence of a "genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State
must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control." Convention on the High Seas,
April 29, 1958, art. 5, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315 T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered
into force for the United States Sept. 30, 1962).
' Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (Supp. V 1987). See
infra notes 44-72 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra text accompanying notes 43-72.
" See infra note 21.
2 888 F.2d 918 (lst Cir. 1989).
13 See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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distribute marijuana, in violation of section 1903(a), (c), and (f)
of the Act. 4 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit the defendants argued their vessel was not
subject to United States jurisdiction when the Coast Guard
boarded and searched. The First Circuit reversed the jury con-
viction, holding there was insufficient evidence to prove the
United States had subject matter jurisdiction over the
defendants. 5
Subject matter jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas has
been applied broadly by the judiciary, thus enabling the United
States to board, search and seize vessels subject to United States
jurisdiction anywhere in the world." The First Circuit in this
decision interpreted the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
under its plain meaning to effectively narrow the far-reaching
United States jurisdiction and restated the narrow circum-
stances when the United States lacks jurisdiction on the high
seas.
1 7
This note examines the application of United States juris-
diction when United States criminal laws are applied extraterri-
torially to foreign crew members aboard foreign registered ves-
sels. Part I of the note examines the history of United States
jurisdiction over vessels on navigable seas, including the present-
day Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. Part II specifically
examines the United States v. Maynard decision and the
United States' jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels on the
high seas. Part III examines the weaknesses in the United
States' jurisdictional analysis and alternative arguments that
could have supported a finding of jurisdiction over the defend-
4 See infra notes 79-81, 83 for text of these sections.
'5 See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
IS See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.) , cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 93 (1988)(Panamanian registered vessel boarded by the United States Coast Guard
500 nautical miles off United States coast); United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7, 9 (1st
Cir. 1984) (Danish registered vessel boarded by United States Coast Guard 270 miles off
northeastern coast of United States); United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 155
(5th Cir. 1984) (Panamanian registered vessel boarded 250 miles off the coast of United
States in the Gulf of Mexico); United States v. Greyshock, 719 F. Supp. 927, 929 (D.
Haw. 1989) (United States Coast Guard arrested crew 600 miles northeast of Oahu Ha-
waii); United States v. Aikens, 685 F. Supp 732, 735 (D. Haw. 1988) (vessel boarded by
the Coast Guard 600 to 800 miles southeast of Hawaiian Islands).
" See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
1990]
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ants in United States v. Maynard.
PART I: HISTORY OF UNITED STATES JURISDICTION
According to accepted principles of international law, the
navigable sea is divided into three zones:"8 the inland waters, 9
the territorial waters20 and the high seas.21 The United States
claims a three nautical mile territorial sea zone.2 2 The area past
this three nautical miles of territorial sea is considered the high
seas, but generally it is accepted that a coastal nation may exer-
cise limited control for customs purposes over a declared area
that is designated "customs waters. '23 The United States exer-
18 United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22 (1969), reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 994
(1969).
19 Id. at 22. Inland waters include internal waters such as rivers, lakes and canals.
Nations have absolute sovereignty in inland waters, as if the waters were an extension of
their land. Therefore, nations have authority to exclude foreign vessels altogether. Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force for the United States Sept. 10,
1964) [hereinafter Convention on the Territorial Sea].
20 Territorial waters is the area of the sea over which a nation claims and exercises
substantial control. However "ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." Convention on the Territorial Sea,
supra note 19, at art. 14. Presently, the extent of nations' territorial waters varies be-
cause the international community was unable to agree upon uniform distances at the
April 29, 1958 Geneva Conference. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22 n.24 (1969). A United Na-
tions convention on the law of the sea was opened for signature on December 10, 1982.
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)[hereinafter UNCLOS III]. If UNCLOS III is ratified
eventually, this convention would establish a 12 nautical mile limit for the territorial sea.
Id. at art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. In addition, it would permit a nation to exercise within 24
nautical miles of its coast the control necessary to enforce its laws within its territory
and territorial sea. Id. at art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
2' The high seas, also known as international waters, is the area beyond the territo-
rial sea. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. at 2314; 21 U.S.C. §
955b(b) (1982); Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 23
U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. V 1987). United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1149 n.1
(11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064-65 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v, Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1073 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1980). Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas states, "The high seas being
open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its
sovereignty." Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314.
22 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1982). See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122
(1923); see generally P. JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURIS-
DICTION, 56-60, 75-112 (1927).
21 Within the "customs waters" nations have limited jurisdiction to assure compli-
ance with fiscal, customs and sanitation laws. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/8
UNITED STATES v. MAYNARD
cises limited control for customs purposes over waters that ex-
tend to twelve nautical miles from the coast.24 For the purpose
of criminal jurisdiction, the United States recognizes the area
beyond the three mile territorial sea zone as the high seas.25
The United States has exercised jurisdiction over activities
note 19, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. at 1612. This area is also referred to as the contiguous zone.
Under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the United
States is granted limited jurisdiction over a contiguous zone (customs waters) outside the
territorial sea but not exceeding twelve miles from the United States' coast. Williams,
617 F.2d at 1073.
24 The Tariff Act of 1930 defines "customs waters" in an uncommon way:
The term 'customs waters' means, in the case of a foreign vessel subject to a treaty
or other arrangement between a foreign government and the United States ena-
bling or permitting the authorities of the United States to board, examine, search,
seize, or otherwise to enforce upon such vessel upon the high seas the laws of the
United States, the waters within such distance of the coast of the United States as
the said authorities are or may be so enabled or permitted by such treaty or ar-
rangement and, in the case of every other vessel, the waters within four leagues of
the coast of the United States.
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1988).
The customs waters definition in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(6) also is defined in Anti-Smug-
gling Act of 1935, 19 U.S.C. § 1709(c) (1988). Customs waters can be extended beyond
the normal limit of one hour's sailing time provided an arrangement exists between the
United States and the foreign nation. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th
Cir. 1987); Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1153; United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 935
(11th Cir. 1985). "The 'arrangement' necessary to create customs waters around a spe-
cific vessel may be informal, as long as there is a clear indication of consent by the
foreign government." United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013 (1988) (citing Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 933). Consent by a for-
eign nation can be a sufficient arrangement to create customs waters, even if that con-
sent is obtained after a foreign vessel has been boarded and searched. Alomia-Riascos,
825 F.2d at 771. United States v. Molinares Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1216-17 (1st Cir.
1987) (validity of ad hoc arrangement assumed), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 233 (1989).
Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 2 (1988) (the court upheld conviction of foreign nationals under
this construction of section 1401(j) under the former 21 U.S.C. section 955a(c)). Peter-
son, 812 F.2d at 492-93 (the court held that the consent of a foreign government brought
the boarding of a ship within the customs waters of the United States under the former
section 955a(c)). See also United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1549-50 (11th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Vouloup, 625 F. Supp. 1266, 1267-68 (D.P.R. 1985).
Under section 1903(c)(1)(D), if a vessel is considered within the customs waters of
the United States, then the United States has jurisdiction under the same analysis of
customs waters used in the former statute section 955a(c). United States v. Biermann,
678 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (the court held there was an arrangement with
the United Kingdom enabling United States authorities to board, search and seize the
vessel). See infra text accompanying notes 64-66, 111-13.
25 See supra note 21. United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 613 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1980).
1990]
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on the high seas by applying its laws extraterritorially.26 Most
courts have held that in order for the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over a vessel on the high seas, whether the vessel is
stateless or not, the jurisdictional basis must be founded on one
of the five principles of jurisdiction 7 accepted under interna-
tional law: (1) the territorial principle;2 8 (2) the nationality prin-
26 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978) (the court stated
that because the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenses on the high
seas, 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) authorities the United States Coast Guard to stop and board
vessels on the high seas to enforce these extraterritorial offenses); Williams, 617 F.2d
1063 (overruling Cadena). United States v. Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Fla.
1981) (the court held that 21 U.S.C. § 955a is a "legitimate and appropriate assertion of
extra-territorial jurisdiction"); Williams, 617 F.2d at 1076-77 (the court held the United
States has extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United States
that have an effect within its sovereign territory); Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d at 156.
27 There are conflicting numbers of principles of international jurisdiction ranging
from four to six. Some legal scholars recognize these jurisdictional principles by different
names. Five principles of jurisdiction were first discussed in Harvard Research in Inter-
national Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. The Harvard Research designa-
tion incorporated the "law of the flag" principle as a corollary to the "territorial" princi-
ple. Most cases, treatises and commentators have adopted the Harvard Research desig-
nations. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1110 (1982); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373,
1380-82 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 10-36 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)].
"8 Under the territorial principle, a State having a criminal law against proscribed
acts has exclusive jurisdiction over such acts occurring within its territory regardless of
the offender's nationality. Harvard Research, supra note 27, at 445, 480; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 27, at § 17; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment c (1989) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; Church
v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804); Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). The territorial principle has been accepted by all nations.
Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10; Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
The territorial principle incorporates a corollary, the "law of the flag" theory or the
"floating territorial" principle, which gives a State exclusive jurisdiction over any offense
committed by a vessel registered to that particular State. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 584-85 (1953); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933); United States v.
Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); 9 DIGEST INT'L L. 22-23 (M. Whiteman ed. 1968)
[hereinafter Whiteman]; Anderson, Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels on the High
Seas: an Appraisal Under Domestic and International Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 323,
338 (1982) [hereinafter Anderson]. To summarize, the territorial principle treats the ves-
sel as a mobile part of that State. Such jurisdiction is necessary otherwise every time a
vessel moved to different territories the law governing the conduct of that vessel would
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/8
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ciple;29 (3) the protective principle;30 (4) the passive personality
principle;3 and (5) the universality theory.3 2 The United States
expressed its intention to adhere to these jurisdictional princi-
ples of international law in The Paquete Habana.3 3 Under the
change, which would create chaos.
29 The nationality principle recognizes the authority to confer subject matter juris-
diction upon a State for violations of that State's law regardless of where the violations
occur, even when such violations are extraterritorial. Harvard Research, supra note 27,
at 445; Whiteman, supra note 28, at 51; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27,'at § 34;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, at § 402; L. Oppenheim, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW §
145, at 330 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 613 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972,
(1981); Egan, 501 F. Supp. at 1258.
" The protective principle allows a State to exercise jurisdiction over acts commit-
ted outside the State threatening its security or operation of its governmental functions.
Harvard Research, supra note 27, at 445, 543; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at
§ 33; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, at § 402 comment f, 402(3); Pizzarusso, 388
F.2d at 10-11; Egan, 501 F. Supp. at 1257-58.
" The passive personality principle confers jurisdiction upon a State when one of its
nationals is a victim of an offense. Harvard Research, supra note 27, at 445; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 38; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, at § 402
comment g; Rivard, 375 F.2d at 885; Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 216. This principle gener-
ally is not acknowledged by the United States. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1381 n.15;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 30(2).
32 The universality principle recognizes all States have subject matter jurisdiction in
any forum having custody over any perpetrator of offenses universally recognized as hei-
nous or harmful to mankind and condoned by all nations as violations of the Law of
Nations. Presently, this principle applies to piracy and slave trading. Harvard Research,
supra note 27, at 445, 563-564; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 34; Conven-
tion on the High Seas, supra note 8, art. 13-19, 13 U.S.T. at 2316-17; United States v.
Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820); United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 412, 417 (1820). Narcotics trafficking has not achieved the universality status of
piracy and slave trading. Yet some authorities argue the universality principle should
apply. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) section 522 comment d states "[t]here is a movement
to extend these rules to illicit traffic in narcotic drugs." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 28, at § 522 comment d. An attempt by the international community to make drug
trafficking a universally condemned crime was initiated in the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 18 U.S.T 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force
Dec. 13, 1964, for the United States June 24, 1967) [hereinafter Single Convention]
which recognizes that drug trafficking is a serious threat to mankind. The United States
is a signatory of this Convention and also a signatory of the Protocol amending the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Aug. 8, 1975).
33 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The court held that United States seizure of a Spanish flag-
ged fishing vessel captured off the coast of Cuba violated international law. Id. at 714.
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protective principle, 4 the United States has applied its laws to
obtain jurisdiction over many vessels on the high seas in its cam-
paign to combat drug smuggling.
The United States Congress in 1970 enacted the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,85 which inad-
vertently contained a section repealing the criminal provision
under which drug smugglers apprehended on the high seas were
prosecuted, without creating a new provision to replace it."6
From 1970 to 1980 the United States Coast Guard boarded and
seized vessels on the high seas to no avail. Many drug traffickers
were unable to be convicted of possession with intent to dis-
The court stated, "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. at 714. Since
The Paquete Habana decision, courts consistently have upheld intentions to follow prin-
ciples of international law. United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259, 1264 (5th Cir.
1985); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (N.D. Cal 1988);
United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
" The protective principle recognizes that a nation may assert jurisdiction over for-
eign vessels on the high seas that threaten its security or governmental functions. The
nation need not demonstrate an actual effect on the nation itself. U.S. v. Robinson, 843
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10-11 which held drug trafficking
may be prevented under the protective principle); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d
486, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1987) (the protective principle applies); Biermann, 678 F. Supp. at
1444 (the court held the protective principle supports the extraterritorial reach of section
1903). See also United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 n.20 (lth Cir. 1985) (citing Rivard,
375 F.2d at 885); James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. at 1344. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d at
156 (court rejected appellants' argument that the protective principle should not apply).
Commentators have argued the universality principle should apply to support the extra-
territorial reach of section 1903. See supra note 32.
3' Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, supra note 21.
"6 21 U.S.C. section 184(a) (repealed October 26, 1970), prohibited the use of narcot-
ics on board United States vessels on the high seas. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act did not include a similar provision and only allowed for
prohibition against possession of narcotics in the territorial United States, in turn legal-
izing possession on the high seas. Id.; United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.)
(landmark case that brought to light the loophole left by the repeal of section 184(a)),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2785 [hereinafter Senate Report] (discusses the
difficulty to prosecute drug traffickers before the enactment of 21 U.S.C. section 955a).
See United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 369 n.6 (4th Cir. 1982) (court held the
legislation was enacted to reach drug traffickers outside the territorial limits of United
States and to fill statutory void from "inadvertent" repeal by the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/8
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tribute because of the loophole left by the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 7 The only way to convict
persons apprehended on the high seas was on a charge of con-
spiracy because although the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act prohibited possession of narcotics
within United States waters, it did not forbid possession on the
high seas unless there was evidence of conspiracy or attempt to
import or distribute the narcotics into the United States.38 Thus,
the legislative loophole in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act, rather than a lack of jurisdiction to
prosecute, prevented the government from securing
convictions. 9
In 1980, Congress enacted the Marijuana on the High Seas
Act, 21 U.S.C. section 955a, as a response to substantial deficien-
37 Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d at 369-70; United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 16 (1st Cir.
1981).
See generally United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 26-30 (Ist Cir. 1983) (the court
discusses the United States Coast Guard's statutory authority to search foreign ships in
international waters under 14 U.S.C. section 89(a) as well as under international legal
principles).
se 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982). This statute provided for criminal penalties for attempts
or conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Section 846 provided: "Any person
who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punisha-
ble by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982). Section 846 was amended November 18, 1988 but
the effect of the statute is still the same. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). Section 963 prohibits
attempts or conspiracies to violate, inter alia, sections 952(a) and 959, to import con-
trolled substances and to manufacture or distribute controlled substances with the intent
or knowledge that the drugs will be imported unlawfully. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1988). Sections
841, 846, 952, 959 and 963 are the penal provisions that the United States adopted to
effectuate its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
Under Article 4 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs the "[plarties shall take
such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary: (a) To give effect and
carry out the provisions of this Convention within their own territories; (b) To cooperate
with other states in the execution of the provisions of this Convention." Single Conven-
tion, supra note 32, at art. 4, 18 U.S.T. at 1413. See United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7
(1st Cir. 1984).
19 H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979) [hereinafter House Report];
Senate Report, supra note 36, at 2785-86; see also Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
For further discussions on the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, see Anderson, supra note 28, at 324-26; Lewis, The Marijuana on the High
Seas Act: Extending U.S. Jurisdiction Beyond International Limits, 8 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 369-72 (1982); Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Ti-
tle 21: Overextension of the Protective Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 688, 700-03 (1982).
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cies in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act and to broaden the scope of federal narcotics law. 0 In the
statutory language of section 955a as well as its legislative his-
tory, Congress expressed a clear intent to authorize extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction within the bounds of international law.4' Section
955a(a) of the Act specifically prohibits any person on board a
United States vessel or a vessel subject to the United States' ju-
risdiction on the high seas from knowingly or intentionally pos-
sessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or
distribute.42
Stateless vessels were intended to be included under section
955a. Under section 955b(d) a" 'vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States' includes a vessel without a nationality or a
vessel assimilated to a vessel without a nationality, in accor-
dance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the Convention on the
High Seas, 1958." 43 Therefore, section 955a expressly extends
subject matter jurisdiction over drug traffickers aboard stateless
vessels on the high seas without requiring a nexus between the
alleged crime and the United States.
As an amendment to the Marijuana on the High Seas Act,
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act of 1986"" was to create
an even broader basis of subject matter jurisdiction over crimes
committed on the high seas.45 The Senate report pertaining to
this amendment stated that prior to the amendment some de-
fendants successfully escaped prosecution by "relying heavily on
international jurisdictional questions and legal technicalities." '46
The amendment therefore included a provision to prohibit indi-
vidual defendants from relying as a defense on the government's
non-compliance with international law.
47
" See supra note 39.
" See supra note 39. United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1152 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981);.
42 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (1982).
21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) (1981).
" 46 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (Supp. V 1987). This Act is the amended and recodified
version effective November 10, 1986.
" See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
46 S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5986, 6000 (hereinafter Senate Report 21.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 1903(d) (Supp. V 1987). This section states in pertinent part: "A
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In the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act,4 Congress de-
clared: "[Tihat trafficking in controlled substances aboard ves-
sels is a serious international problem and is universally con-
demned. Moreover, such trafficking presents a specific threat to
security and societal well-being of the United States." 9 Con-
gress stated under section 1903(h) of the new Act, "[t]his section
is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribu-
tion committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."
50
In section 1903(a), Congress consolidated the offenses under
sections 955a(a), (b) and (c) making them one offense and also
deleted section 955a(d).5 ' The offenses were consolidated be-
cause each of the previously enumerated offenses had slightly
different jurisdictional requirements that had to be satisfied, 2
claim of failure to comply with international law in the enforcement of this chapter may
be invoked solely by a foreign nation, and a failure to comply with international law shall
not divest a court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a defense to any proceeding
under this chapter." 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d) (Supp. V 1987). Section 1903(d) indicates de-
fendants have no standing to object to alleged deficiencies in United States compliance
to jurisdictional requirements. The legislative history clearly demonstrates that Congress
intended to foreclose this argument to defendants. The Senate Report stated: "In the
view of the Committee, only the flag nation of a vessel should have a right to question
whether the Coast Guard has boarded that vessel with the required consent. The inter-
national law of jurisdiction is an issue between sovereign nations. Drug smuggling is uni-
versally recognized criminal behavior, and defendants should not be allowed to inject
these collateral issues into their trials." Senate Report 2, supra note 46, at 6001. The
-court in United States v. Biermann held defendant did not have standing to object to
any alleged deficiencies under section 1903(d). United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp.
1437, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1988). United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987).
8 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (Supp. V 1987).
" 46 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. V 1987). This section was formerly classified to section
955b of Title 21, Food and Drugs.
:0 46 U.S.C. § 1903(h) (Supp. V 1987).
' Former 21 U.S.C. section 955a(d) provided a separate offense for possession with
intent to import. Essentially, section 955a(d) required some nexus with the United
States for conviction. This section was not included in the new statute, thus eliminating
the necessity to show some injury directly to the United States to be convicted.
12 Senate Report 2, supra note 46, at 6001, (four separate offenses stated in the
previous law are now consolidated into a single offense.) United States v. Potes, 880 F.2d
1475 (1st Cir. 1989). See also House Report, supra note 39, at 9-10. In United States v.
Molinares Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987) the court held "[ejach of the four
offenses in section 955a[(a)-(d)] focuses on a different jurisdictional basis: the vessel's
nationality, the citizenship of those on board, the waters in which the vessel sails, or that
it is the United States to which the illegal cargo is intended to be imported." See, e.g.
United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1549 (1st Cir. 1989).
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thus hindering prosecution."
The new Act, section 1903(a), uses the same wording as sec-
tion 955b(d), a "[vjessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States."5' Although the language is old, Congress has construed
the words as having a meaning that includes a "vessel registered
in a foreign nation where the flag nation has consented or
waived objection to the enforcement of United States law[s].""
The former statute, section 955a(c), had been interpreted by the
courts to contain the same type of jurisdiction over foreign ves-
sels on the high seas as defined under section 1903(c)(1)(C)."
Prosecuting under former section 955a(c) required "a compli-
cated cross reference to an unusual definition of the words 'cus-
toms waters'" in 19 U.S.C. section 1401(j). 57 Upon establishing
the existence of customs waters, it was criminal to possess drugs
aboard a foreign vessel on the high seas when the foreign flag
nation permitted the United States to prosecute.58 Such consent
to prosecute could be achieved by treaty or other arrangement.59
Section 1903(c)(1)(C)60 expressly provides for United States
jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels on the high seas without
the complicated cross reference to 19 U.S.C. section 1401(j). In
order for the United States to obtain jurisdiction under section
1903(c)(1)(C) and still adhere to Congress' and the courts' long-
standing intent to promulgate and interpret United States laws
within the principles of jurisdiction under international law, it is
" Doe, 878 F.2d at 1549; United States v. Christensen, 732 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir.
1984).
" This phrase, a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, as defined in
21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) (1982), refers only to stateless vessels and the equivalent in accor-
dance with Article 6, para. 2 of the Convention on the High Seas.-21 U.S.C. § 955b(d)
(1981).
" 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1987); infra note 80. Doe, 878 F.2d at 1549.
" United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
11 See 19 U.S.C. § 14010), supra note 24. Doe, 878 F.2d at 1549 (quoting United
States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1988) which states "if a foreign government
'by treaty or other arrangement' permits the United States 'to enforce [its laws] upon ...
[a] vessel upon the high seas' the waters around the vessel become 'customs waters,' and
21 U.S.C. § 955a(c) then forbids drug possession"). Id.
"I See supra note 57. United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir.
1985). See United States v. Gonzales, 776 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Layne, 599 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
"5 See supra note 57. See also Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1152; United States v.
Marsh, 747 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1984); Biermann, 678 F. Supp. at 1442.
60 See infra note 80.
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necessary to obtain consent or waived objection by the foreign
flagged vessel's nation to the enforcement of United States laws
by United States authorities. 1 The necessary consent still can
be satisfied by treaty or other arrangement, as was permitted
under former section 955a(c).2 Therefore, if a foreign nation
consents to the United States enforcing its laws over the nation's
flagged vessel, the United States has unbounding jurisdiction
over that vessel on the high seas without a nexus requirement to
prove intent to import illicit drugs to the United States. The Act
only requires that the offenders knowingly or intentionally man-
ufacture or distribute a controlled substance."
Section 1903(c)(1)(D)64 permits the United States to board,
examine, search, seize or otherwise enforce United States laws
upon foreign flagged vessels on the high seas in conjunction with
19 U.S.C. section 1401(j) as was allowed under former section
955a(c).6 5 The United States can obtain this jurisdiction over
foreign vessels as long as there is a treaty or other arrangement
to bring the vessels within the customs waters of the United
States. 6 Therefore, under this construction of the Act the
United States can obtain jurisdiction over a foreign flagged ves-
sel under either section 1903(c)(1)(C) or (D).
All nations that are signatories to the Convention of the
High Seas6 7 including the United States, have expressed juris-
diction over stateless vessels on the high seas.6 8 Section
1903(c)(1)(B)6' expressly provides for United States jurisdiction
over stateless vessels. The determination that a vessel is state-
less only requires: (1) the flag nation to deny the claimed nation-
ality of the vessel;70 (2) the master of the vessel to fail to make a
6' See supra note 33.
62 United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Peterson,
812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987); Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1984).
46 U.S.C. § 1903(a) (Supp. V 1987).
, See infra note 80.
6' United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v.
Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
" See supra note 24.
67 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8.
6 Id., at art. 6, para. (2), 13 U.S.T. at 2315.
6 See infra note 80.
'o 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987), infra note 80.
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claim of nationality of the vessel upon request of proper United
States authorities;71 (3) the vessel to sail under two or more na-
tions' flags, according to convenience.
In United States v. Maynard7 3 the United States attempted
to establish jurisdiction over a drug-laden vessel, the Carpe
Diem, on the high seas by virtue of the vessel being stateless
under the second or third requirements of the rules deeming a
vessel stateless.
PART II: United States v. Maynard - UNITED STATES
JURISDICTION
A. Facts
On February 16, 1988, the United States Coast Guard Cut-
ter, the Vashon was conducting a routine patrol in international
waters74 along the southern coast of Puerto Rico when it sighted
a thirty-foot sailing vessel, the Carpe Diem. The Carpe Diem
was deemed to be approximately twenty nautical miles south of
Ponce, Puerto Rico. In accordance with the internationally rec-
ognized "Right of Approach,"7 the Vashon maneuvered along-
side the sailing vessel to indicate to the Carpe Diem crew mem-
bers that the commanding officer of the Vashon, Captain
William L. Ross, wanted to speak with them on the VHF marine
radio. During the radio conversation, the master of the Carpe
Diem, defendant Errol Maynard, stated the crew was sailing
1 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1987), infra note 80.
7" Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at art. 6, para. (2), 13 U.S.T. at 2315;
46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987), infra note 80.
" 888 F.2d 918 (lst Cir. 1989).
" See supra note 21.
" The "Right of Approach" is a doctrine of international maritime law that allows a
nation's warships to hail and board an unidentified vessel for the limited purpose of
ascertaining its nationality. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42-44 (1825);
United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1149 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Monroy, 614 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 870-71 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Petrulla, 457 F.
Supp. 1367, 1372 n.1 (1978). The "Right of Approach" is codified in Article 22 of the
Convention on the High Seas. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, 13 U.S.T. at
2318. The U.S. Coast Guard also has statutory authority to board vessels on the high
seas to verify registry. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1982), supra note 24, for further discussion. See
also United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 1982); Williams, 617
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from Venezuela to Barbuda. Maynard complied with a request
by Ross to board the vessel.
A four-man armed boarding party, commanded by Lieuten-
ant Michael Emerson, then was dispatched from the Vashon.
The boarding party circled the Carpe Diem, and Maynard ver-
bally confirmed permission to board. The boarding party noted
there were two other people aboard the Carpe Diem, defendants
Glen Petersen and Austin Caines. Once aboard, Emerson and his
men smelled marijuana and responded by conducting a full se-
curity sweep76 search of the entire vessel including all interior
compartments. The search turned up 660 kilograms of mari-
juana. Other items found included: several nations' flags other
than the British Virgin Islands' courtesy flag flying; two radio
licenses with United States Virgin Islands' registration numbers;
a British passport for Maynard that indicated he was from the
British Virgin Islands; a driver's license belonging to Petersen
indicating he also was a citizen of the British Virgin Islands.
Influenced by the presence of the marijuana, Emerson
radioed back to Ross. He recommended that the Carpe Diem be
considered a stateless vessel because no evidence of registration
or documentation of the vessel's nationality was found and that
the Carpe Diem should be seized.
Ross requested and received a statement of "no objection" 77
to seizing the Carpe Diem as a stateless vessel. The statement of
"no objection" was the end product of a series of contacts made
between Ross, his operational commander in Puerto Rico and
the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard in Washing-
ton, D.C."' After the "no objection" clearance, Emerson arrested
71 Maynard, 888 F.2d at 920. A security sweep in which the interior compartments
are examined has been held within the statutory authority of the United States Coast
Guard if the boarding of a vessel is lawful.
" See infra note 90.
78 This was the proper chain of authority within the United States Coast Guard for
seeking clearance to seize the vessel. However, the Commandant of the United States
Coast Guard in Washington D.C. should have sought express consent of the United
Kingdom to seize or a denial by the United Kingdom that the vessel was in fact a United
Kingdom registered vessel under 46 U.S.C section 1903(c). Maynard, 888 F.2d at 925.
See infra notes 80, 90.
The Coast Guard also has relied previously on the agreement between the United
Kingdom and United States that gives the United States consent to board and seize
United Kingdom registered vessels in the Caribbean Sea and to consider the vessels
within the "customs waters" of the United States. See supra note 24 and accompanying
1990]
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the three defendants and seized the Carpe Diem.
B. District Court's Finding of Jurisdictional Basis
On February 24, 1988, the three defendants, citizens of the
United Kingdom, British Virgin Islands, were indicted on a one
count charge for possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act,
46 U.S.C. section 1903(a),79 (c), 0 (f),81 and 18 U.S.C. section 2.
text; infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text. The Commandant in this situation had
several options to seek authority to give Ross clearance to seize the Carpe Diem. But
declaring the Carpe Diem a stateless vessel without further inquiry was improper and a
violation of United States law under 46 U.S.C. section 1903(c). Maynard, 888 F.2d at
924-25.
79 46 U.S.C. section 1903(a) provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on board a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to knowingly or inten-
tionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or
distribute, a controlled substance.
46 U.S.C. § 1903(a) (Supp. V 1987).
80 46 U.S.C. section 1903(c)(1) provides:
"vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" includes- (A) a vessel
without a nationality; (B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without a nationality, in
accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas; (C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation has con-
sented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United
States; (D) a vessel located within the customs waters of the United States; and
(E) a vessel located in the territorial water of another nation, where the nation
consents to the enforcement of United States law by the United States.
Consent or waiver of objection by a foreign nation to the enforcement of
United States law by the United States under subparagraph (C) and (E) of this
paragraph may be obtained by radio, telephone, or similar oral means, and may be
proved by certification of the Secretary of State or the Secretary's designee.
46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987). U.S.C. section 1903(c)(2) provides:
"vessel without a nationality" includes- (A) a vessel aboard which the master or
person in charge makes a claim of registry, which claim is denied by the flag na-
tion whose registry is claimed;, and (B) and vessel aboard which the master or
person in charge fails, upon request of an officer of the United States empowered
to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of national-
ity or registry for that vessel.
46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(2) (Supp. V. 1987). 46 U.S.C. section 1903(c)(3) provides that a claim
of nationality or registry only includes:
(A) possession on board the vessel and production of documents evidencing the
vessel's nationality in accordance with article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas; (B) flying its flag nation's ensign or flag: or (C) a verbal claim of na-
tionality or registry by the master or person in charge of the vessel.
46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
" 46 U.S.C. section 1903(f) provides for jurisdiction and venue, infra note 83. 46
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The defendants entered a not guilty plea. On March 15, 1988,
they filed a motion to suppress the marijuana evidence, claiming
the United States lacked jurisdiction to board and search the
vessel. The motion was denied.
On April 20, 1988, a two-day jury trial commenced in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. 3
The defendants renewed their motion to suppress the evidence.
The defendants also submitted a motion for a judgment of ac-
quittal,84 pursuant to Rule 29, claiming the United States Coast
Guard did not have jurisdiction when it boarded the Carpe
Diem. These motions were denied at the close of the govern-
ment's case and again at the close of all the evidence.
The defendants maintained, during the trial, that even if
the United States had jurisdiction, they did not intentionally
possess or distribute illegal drugs, which is an element of the
crime that must be shown to convict the defendants. The de-
fendants argued the marijuana was forced upon them by the
people who had hired them to deliver the Carpe Diem from
Venezuela to Barbuda. They testified that at the time they
agreed to transport the sailboat they had no intention of pos-
sessing or distributing drugs. The defendants stated that a few
hours after they left shore, the people who had hired them to
deliver their sailboat intercepted them in a speedboat and forced
them at gunpoint to take the marijuana. They also testified they
intended to notify the authorities upon docking.
The government argued the three-man crew intentionally
possessed marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act sections 1903 (a) and (c).
The Act was revised to expand United States jurisdiction on the
.high seas in furtherance of American efforts to curb drug traf-
U.S.C. § 1903(f) (Supp. V 1987).
82 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). This statute provides that any person who commits an of-
fense against the United States is punishable as a principle.
63 The District Court was the proper court under section 1903(f) which provides in
pertinent part: "Any person who violates this section shall be tried in the United States
district court at the point of entry where that person enters the United States, or in the
United States District Court of the District of Columbia." 46 U.S.C. § 1903(f) (Supp. V
1987).
84 A Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal is used in the place of motions for
directed verdict which are abolished. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
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ficking.8 5 The United States cited two reasons for claiming juris-
diction over the Carpe Diem under the Act's provisions. First,
under section 1903(c)(3)(A), the Carpe Diem did not have regis-
tration or documentation papers on board to prove the national-
ity of the vessel."0 Second, under section 1903(c)(3)(B), Emer-
son's search uncovered flags of several nations, thus indicating
the Carpe Diem was stateless because at any moment a new flag
could be raised. 7
The jury was not convinced by the defendants' argument
that there was a lack of intent to possess and distribute a con-
trolled substance; such an intention is a required element of the
crime. The jury accepted the government's claim of jurisdiction,
finding the United States had jurisdiction over the Carpe Diem
because it was a vessel without a nationality. The jury rendered
a guilty verdict, finding the defendants guilty of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 46 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1903(a), (c) and (f).
" See supra text accompanying notes 44-66.
" This is a meritless argument because neither the Convention on the High Seas
nor section 1903(c)(3) require that all vessels must possess on board documents evidenc-
ing their nationality. Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas only requires "[e]ach
State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to
that effect." Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at art. 5, para. (2), 13 U.S.T. at
2315. It does not specifically require that each vessel shall carry and produce those docu-
ments on request. Id. However as a practical matter it is extremely difficult to gain legal
entry into another state without documentation of the vessel. United States law under
section 1903(c)(3) does not require that a claim of nationality only can be satisfied by
possession or production of documents evidencing the vessel's nationality. However, pos-
session and production of documents is only one means to satisfy a claim of nationality.
46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
"' This second argument by the government is also meritless because it is common
practice for ships to carry courtesy flags of many nations. This common practice is neces-
sitated by the fact that in most territorial waters and ports of a state, foreign vessels are
required to fly the courtesy flag of that state while present. Therefore a transient vessel
generally carries many courtesy flags in order to comply with the requirements of other
states. The fact that the Carpe Diem had other flags aboard is not dispositive to show
that it was a stateless vessel and might at any moment change its declared nationality by
raising another nation's flag. If the Carpe Diem had in fact raised another flag it would
have been deemed a stateless vessel under Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention on
the High Seas. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at art. 6, para. (2), 13 U.S.T.
at 2315. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1260 n.15 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coast Guard
officer testified that it is customary for a vessel to fly the flag of a nation as it enters that
nation's port and therefore evidence that other flags were found aboard is not conclusive
that the vessel is stateless). See also United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 256 (2d
Cir. 1983).
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/8
UNITED STATES v. MAYNARD
C. First Circuit Denies Jurisdiction
Defendants appealed the conviction on the ground, inter
alia, that their vessel was not subject to United States jurisdic-
tion when the Coast Guard boarded and searched it. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the jury
conviction. The court ruled there was insufficient evidence to
justify a finding that the Carpe Diem was subject to United
States jurisdiction by virtue of being a vessel without a national-
ity.88 A procedural error by the Coast Guard was the main rea-
son behind the court's finding of no jurisdiction. According to
the court, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard
violated section 1903 (c)(1)(C) 9
The violation of section 1903(c)(1)(C) occurred when the
Commandant determined on his own accord that the Carpe
Diem was stateless, and the Commandant failed to seek confir-
mation from the United Kingdom that the vessel was indeed
stateless. Interpreting section 1903 (c)(2)(A), the court held the
proper procedure the Coast Guard must follow prior to declaring
a vessel stateless is to seek verification from the vessel's alleged
flag nation that the vessel is not in fact registered in that nation.
In the alternative, the court stated that if a vessel is indeed reg-
istered under the nation whose flag is raised, then the vessel's
claim of nationality is satisfied under section 1903 (c)(3)(B),
thus eliminating the possibility of United States jurisdiction
over the vessel without the flag nation's consent.9 0
11 On appeal, the defendants raised two other issues: (1) "whether the district court
erred in its jury instructions," and (2) "whether there was sufficient evidence for a find-
ing that the necessary criminal intent for the offense existed." United States v. Maynard,
888 F.2d 918, 927 n.5. (lst Cir. 1989). The court held it was not necessary to address
these issues based on its holding that the Carpe Diem was not subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States. Id.
8' See supra note 80.
90 United States under its laws requires consent or a statement of "no objection"
from the flag nation under section 1903(c)(1)(C). 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(C) (Supp. V
1987). The United States also has an agreement with the United Kingdom that has been
in force since 1981. The agreement specifies procedures to facilitate the interdiction by
the United States of vessels of the United Kingdom suspected of drug trafficking. The
United States must follow these procedures before seizing a British registered vessel.
The United Kingdom agreed to consent to the United States searching a vessel if the
United States has reasonable belief that the vessel has on board a cargo of drugs for
importation into the United States in violation of United States laws, and the United
Kingdom will not object to the vessel being seized and taken to a United States port.
1990]
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The court held it was necessary for the Commandant to
seek the United Kingdom's consent to the application of United
States laws because the Carpe Diem satisfied at least one, if not
two, of the three alternative section 1903(c)(3) requirements
under which a claim of nationality can be established." Al-
though two government witnesses offered conflicting testimony
about what flag the Carpe Diem was flying,92 the court held that
regardless of which version of the facts was to be believed, the
Carpe Diem could not be deemed a stateless vessel because
there was in fact a flag flying. Even if the Coast Guard could not
identify what nation the flag belonged to, the court held section
1903(c)(3)(B) does not authorize the Coast Guard to declare a
Agreement to Facilitate the Interdiction by the United States of Vessels of the United
Kingdom Suspected of Trafficking in Drugs, Nov. 13, 1981, United Kingdom-United
States, T.I.A.S. No. 10296 [hereinafter Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement]. In United
States v. Biermann, the court held a British flagged vessel and defendants thereon were
subject to United States jurisdiction pursuant to the Act and the Coast Guard had au-
thority to board the vessel without reasonable suspicion or probable cause because of the
agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom enabling United States
authorities to board, examine, search, seize and otherwise enforce upon the high seas
United States laws upon express consent or waived objection by the United Kingdom so
that a vessel flying the flag of the United Kingdom in international waters is considered
to be located within the customs waters of the United States under the Act. United
States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See also supra notes 24,
37.
"' A claim of nationality can be asserted in three alternative ways under section
1903(c)(3) that include:
(A) possession on board the vessel and production of documents evidencing the
vessel's nationality in accordance with article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas; (B) flying its flag nation's ensign or flag; or (C) a verbal claim of na-
tionality or registry by the master or person in charge of the vessel.
46 U.S.C. § 1903(c) (Supp. V 1987). See Maynard, 888 F.2d at 922; United States v.
Potes, 880 F.2d 1475, 1479 (1st Cir. 1989).
" The disputed facts of the trial proceeding arose from conflicting testimony about
what flag the Carpe Diem was flying. Captain Ross testified that prior to boarding the
sailboat, a courtesy flag was observed flying, but that it could not be identified as a
British Virgin Islands' flag until after the Carpe Diem was boarded. Conflicting testi-
mony by another government witness, Emerson, the officer leading the boarding party,
stated the flag that was flying on the Carpe Diem was identified as a British Virgin
Islands' courtesy flag by the U.S. Coast Guard crew before it boarded the vessel. May-
nard, 888 F.2d at 921-22. Captain Ross also testified that the name of the boat, the
Carpe Diem, was painted on the stern, but it did not have a home port or registration
number. Emerson concurred with this testimony. Id. Under international practice it is
customary or required by some countries to have a designated home port and registra-
tion number on a properly registered vessel. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8,
art. 5, 13 U.S.T. at 2315.
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vessel stateless. The court concluded that flying a flag is a valid
claim of nationality that cannot be thwarted due to factors such
as the Coast Guard's inability to identify the flag "whether be-
cause of visibility problems, weather, darkness, size, or
unfamiliarity. "93
The court also determined that the Carpe Diem could have
satisfied its claim of nationality by providing "a verbal claim of
nationality or registry by the master" in accordance with section
1903 (c)(3)(C).'4 The Coast Guard's Law Enforcement Check-
list' documented that during the initial radio contact with May-
nard, master of the Carpe Diem,'6 stated to Captain Ross: (1)
that he was a citizen of the British Virgin Islands; (2) that the
Carpe Diem was registered under the British flag; (3) that a
British Virgin Islands' flag was on board. Emerson's testimony
corroborated the 7th Coast Guard District Law Enforcement
Checklist.' 7
Because the Carpe Diem definitely satisfied its burden of
claiming a nationality via flying a flag and/or possibly via claim-
ing a nationality by verbal declaration, only one means remained
by which the vessel could be found stateless. That means was a
declaration by the nation whose flag was flown that the vessel
was not registered under that nation.' It is undisputed that
Great Britain was never asked to verify or deny Maynard's claim
" Maynard, 888 F.2d at 924.
" 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1987), supra note 80.
" A Law Enforcement Checklist is a document that is routinely prepared by the
Coast Guard for future use in criminal trials and is prefaced with instructions for accu-
racy. It is a record of the events of the Coast Guard's interception of vessels. Maynard,
888 F.2d at 921-22.
96 A master or person in charge of a vessel is authorized to make a verbal claim of
nationality. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1987).
91 This is another disputed fact that arose at the trial proceeding in Emerson's testi-
mony. He was present with Captain Ross during the initial radio conversation prior to
boarding and he prepared the checklist after the interception of the Carpe Diem. Emer-
son testified that Maynard stated he was a British citizen and the vessel was of British
registry. Maynard, 888 F.2d at 921-22. The checklist corroborated Emerson's testimony
because it specifically stated: the British Virgin Islands' flag was observed five minutes
after the Carpe Diem was first sighted by the Vashon crew; during the initial radio con-
tact, before the boarding, Maynard stated to Ross that his nationality was British; the
vessel was registered under the British flag; and a British Virgins Islands' flag was on
board. Captain Ross testified that no identification of the vessel's nor the crew members'
nationality was made during the initial radio communication. Id.
98 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987), supra note 80.
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that the Carpe Diem was a British Virgin Islands' vessel.99
Hence, jurisdiction also could not be found upon this final
alternative.' °
The government was forced to argue that the vessel was
stateless because of the Commandant's failure to follow proper
procedure under United States laws in his determination of the
status of the Carpe Diem. The government was unsuccessful and
lost the case on appeal because although this statute has been
amended and judicially interpreted to create a broad jurisdic-
tional basis, the United States, 10 1 cannot enforce its laws over
foreign vessels on the high seas unless it can be successfully ar-
gued that the United States had consent of the flagged nation to
seize the vessel by treaty or other arrangement; or that the ves-
sel was in the "customs waters" of the United States; or the ves-
sel was located in territorial waters of another nation, where the
nation consents to enforcement of United States law. 10 2
PART III: JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS BY THE UNITED STATES
A. Jurisdiction Under an International Anti-Drug Trafficking
Agreement
In choosing to argue that the Coast Guard had authority to
seize the Carpe Diem as a stateless vessel, the District Attorney
overlooked an alternative argument under which jurisdiction
might have been established. Under the Agreement to Facilitate
'9 "Both Ross and Emerson testified at trial that to their knowledge, at no time was
Great Britain or the British Virgin Islands asked for a statement of 'no objection' to
board the Carpe Diem, nor was there any evidence that anybody made such a request."
Maynard, 888 F.2d at 920. The court in Maynard quoted United States v. Potes, 880
F.2d 1475, 1479 (1st Cir. 1989), which held "that when a claim of Honduran nationality
was verbally made by the vessel's master, but no Honduran flag was flying and the
master could not produce the Honduran registration numbers, there was not sufficient
proof . . . that the claim of Honduran nationality was ever denied by Honduras, and,
therefore, the convictions had to be reversed." Maynard, 888 F.2d at 925. See text of 46
U.S.C. § 1903(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987), supra note 80.
100 The government did not argue as to the Carpe Diem's statelessness under the
alternative prong of the statute, section 1903(c)(2)(B), in which a vessel is deemed to be
stateless if the master "fails to make a claim of nationality or registry" if requested by an
officer of the United States because there was no evidence that Maynard failed to claim a
nationality upon request. Maynard, 888 F.2d at 925. See 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(2)(B)
(Supp. V 1987), supra note 80.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 44-66.
102 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c) (Supp. V 1987), supra note 80.
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the Interdiction by the United States of Vessels of the United
Kingdom Suspected of Trafficking Drugs,10 3 it is plausible that
Great Britain's immediate consent was not necessary in order to
seize the Carpe Diem.10° Thus, the District Attorney did not
have to take the position that the Carpe Diem was a stateless
vessel in order to establish United States jurisdiction. Rather,
the Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement could have provided an
automatic jurisdictional basis for prosecution of the Carpe Diem
crew.
The Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement states the United
Kingdom consents to seizure of United Kingdom flagged vessels
if authorities reasonably believe "that the vessel has on board a
cargo of drugs for importation into the United States."' 015 The
bales of marijuana uncovered during the security sweep estab-
lish such a reasonable belief. Furthermore, even though the
court made no finding as to whether the Carpe Diem was im-
porting its illegal cargo to the United States, case law indicates
courts are quick to find that the United States is the final desti-
nation.'0 6 Thus, the Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement can be
deemed to satisfy the necessary consent element required for ju-
risdiction under section 1903(c)(1)(C).10 7
As further evidence that the United Kingdom intended to
automatically consent to United States jurisdiction under the
Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement, it is worth noting that the
agreement provides a means for the United Kingdom to revoke
its implicit consent within the first fourteen days of a vessel's
seizure.1°8 The United Kingdom also retains the right to object
to prosecution of a seized vessel's crew. 09 Such safeguards indi-
103 Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement, supra note 90.
"' It is notable that the Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement does not require ad-
vanced consent by the United Kingdom to any particular boarding. United States v.
Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See also United States v. Her-
nandez, 655 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (D.P.R. 1989) (the court held the flagged nation's con-
sent valid even though it was given after boarding the vessel, as long as the nation's
ratification of the decision is before trial).
105 Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement, supra note 90, at para. 1.
o See, e.g., United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
107 See supra note 80.
100 Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement, supra note 90, at para. 4.
Id. at para. 5.
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cate the United Kingdom intended for the United States to have
jurisdiction over its flagged vessels unless United Kingdom au-
thorities state otherwise.110
B. Possible Jurisdiction Pursuant to Customs Waters
Analysis
If the District Attorney could have proven that the United
States in fact had consent from the United Kingdom based on
the Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement, then the government
could have established jurisdiction over the Carpe Diem under
section 1903 (c)(1)(D). In that section, Congress specifically de-
fined a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"
as a "vessel located in the customs waters of the United
States."''
The Carpe Diem arguably could have been in the customs
waters of the United States as defined 19 U.S.C. section
1401(j)."12 Courts have interpreted this definition of customs wa-
ters to permit the United States to board a foreign vessel on the
high seas by such an arrangement as the Anti-Drug Trafficking
Agreement or by more informal, properly authorized consent
measures such as by radio, telephone, or similar oral or elec-
tronic means.11 '
C. Conclusion
Had the District Attorney in the trial proceeding conceded
that the Carpe Diem was a foreign flagged vessel and relied in-
10 In the Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement the British government stated it had
"regard to the need for international co-operation in suppressing the illicit traffic in nar-
cotic drugs, which is recognised in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961."
Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement, supra note 90, preamble. See also Single Convention,
supra note 32.
... See supra note 80. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987)
(held that the consent of the flag nation brought the vessel within the customs waters of
the United States).
.1. See supra note 24.
.13 See supra note 80. United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (N.D.
Cal. 1988.) The court concluded that under section 1903(c)(1)(D) the vessel was located
within the customs waters of the United States, as defined by section 1401(j) because
there was an "arrangement" with the United Kingdom enabling United States authori-
ties to board, examine, search and seize the vessel that was actually thirty-five nautical
miles south of Point Reyes, California. Id.
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stead on the statutory provisions that Congress enacted to pro-
vide for jurisdiction, perhaps the convictions would not have
been reversed. There was sufficient evidence that the Carpe
Diem was laden with marijuana of a commercial quantity to con-
vict the defendants of possession with intent to distribute.114
PART IV: CONCLUSION: UNITED STATES RETAINS UNBOUNDED
JURISDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS
Although the United States did not have jurisdiction over
the Carpe Diem, this case cannot be construed as allowing drug
traffickers to reign on the high seas. Frequent interpretations of
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act demonstrate that for-
eign flagged vessels anywhere on the high seas are within the
jurisdictional reach of the United States and subject to prosecu-
tion under the Act. 5 Had the United States followed proper
procedures for obtaining Great Britain's jurisdictional consent,
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act readily would have
provided a jurisdictional basis, and the defendants still would be
serving their sentences today. 1 6
True, the United States must adhere to established proce-
dures for obtaining jurisdiction.'1 7 But adherence is far from dif-
ficult. In this case, a mere telephone call to the proper British
authority would have made the difference between jurisdiction
and the defendants' acquittal. Furthermore, there is no doubt
that if the United States had made that simple telephone call,
the British would have granted automatic consent. 8
Congress fully intended to reach foreign flagged vessels to
the maximum extent permissible under international law when
it enacted the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.1 9 Even
11. United States v. Maynard, 888 F.2d 918, 920 (1st Cir. 1989).
11. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 60-72.
"' The three defendants were sentenced to ten-year prison terms. Sentence Pro-
ceedings at 7, United States v. Maynard, 888 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1989), (No. 88-96).
" See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
118 See supra note 80. See generally United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Layne, 599 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
,19 House Report, supra note 39, at 9.; Senate Report, supra note 36, at 2785;
United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Molinares
Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1217 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d
931, 1154 (11th Cir. 1985).
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more, it is evident that foreign nations desire such broad juris-
diction by the United States. This desire is demonstrated not
only by the formal Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement between
the United States and United Kingdom, but also by informal
agreements drawn frequently with other nations.120 Hence, if na-
tions freely continue to provide jurisdictional consent and the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act remains as written,
United States v. Maynard will be an anomaly in the United
States' effort to combat drug smuggling. The United States will
continue to have unbounded authority to police the high seas in
its effort to curtail the American drug crisis.
Frances S. Blakeslee
120 Panama was not a signator of The Convention on the High Seas when it con-
sented to the United States boarding of its registered vessels. See United States v. Peter-
son, 812 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Pena-Jessie, 763 F.2d 618, 620
(4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985);
Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1149; United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157-
58 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 425 (2d Cir. 1981). Honduras
also has consented to the boarding, search, seizure, and prosecution of the crew mem-
bers. United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 934 (11th Cir. 1985). United States v.
Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1987) (Barbados consented). United States v.
Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 1014 (1980) (Baha-
mian government permitted United States jurisdiction). Great Britain has consented to
boarding even prior to the Anti-Drug Trafficking Agreement. United States v. Green, 671
F.2d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982). United States v. Marsh,
747 F.2d 7, 9 (lst Cir. 1984) (the government of Denmark entered into an arrangement to
consent to search and seize its registered vessels). United States v. Michelena Orovio, 702
F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1983) (Venezuelan authority consented to search of its flagged
vessel). United States v. Greyshock, 719 F. Supp. 927, 929 (D. Haw. 1989) (Cook Islands,
the flag nation, gave consent to board its registered vessel).
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